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TRADE REGULATIONS-Anticompefifive Mergers-The
Jurisdictional Scope of the Celler-Kefauver
Act Has Been Expanded
Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973).
In August of 1966 Stanley Works (Stanley), a major producer and supplier
of hardware, acquired the largest seller of cabinet hardware products in
America, Amerock Corporation.' As Stanley represented 1 percent 2 of the
cabinet hardware market, the Federal Trade Commission decided that the
effect of the Stanley-Amerock merger might substantially lessen competition
in that market, and was therefore violative of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as
amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act. 3 Upon the Commission's ordered
divesture, Stanley petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to
4
review and set that decision aside. It argued that forclosure of a de minimiS
share of a market bars application of the Celler-Kefauver Act, and that the
competitive overlap between Stanley and Amerock in this case was de minimis.
Held-Affirmed. Acquisition of a corporate leader in a concentrated market
by a corporation with merely a 1 percent share of that market substantially
eliminates competition as it forecloses an undue percentage share of the
market.'
History reveals that the backdrop against which section 7 violations of the
Clayton Act have been adjudicated is entwined with the dominant theme which
1. It was agreed to by stipulation that Amerock controlled 22-24 percent of the
market in 1965. Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 501 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973).
2. Stanley's national sales in 1965 ranked 10th in the stipulated market. Stanley
Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 501 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3634
(U.S. June 5, 1973).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). As amended, section 7 now provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
4. De minimis, in the context of antitrust litigation, refers to the direct opposite
of "monopoly proportions." It is a trifling or insignificant amount having no substantial effect on competition. "If the share of the market foreclosed is so large that
it approaches monopoly proportions, the Clayton Act will, of course, have been violated. . . . On the other hand, foreclosure of a de minimis share of the market will
not tend 'substantially to lessen competition.'" Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 328-29 (1962).
5. Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 499 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41
U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973).
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pervaded the Congressional consideration of the Celler-Kefauver Act. 6 This
theme was a fear of what was considered to be a "rising tide of economic
concentration in the American economy."T The Celler-Kefauver Act then,
has become the breakwater to restrain that rising tide. It continues to stand
solid where the Sherman Act has fallen short. 8 Through this Act, Congress has given the Federal Trade Commission and the courts the authority
to arrest mergers while the trend toward a lessening of competition in a
line of commerce 9 is still in its incipiency. 10
In order to brake the increasing force of economic concentration, the Cel-

ler-Kefauver Act was enacted to be applied to situations involving not only

actual competition, 1 ' but also to mergers in which the anticompetitive effects
would be probable and imminent. 12 The test developed to measure this po-

tential lessening of competition is whether at the time of the action, there
was a reasonable probability that the acquisition was likely to result in a tendency toward monopoly."-

To resolve a question of antitrust illegality, the courts must consider several
factors. First, they must analyze the product and geographic market in
which the merging companies compete.' 4 The product market is designated
6. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).
7. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 366
(1970); United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963); Brown

Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).

8. An intended objective of section 7 was to prevent accretions of power which
"are individually so minute as to make it difficult to use the Sherman Act test against
them." See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
9. t A line of commerce is an "area of effective competition" and is determined in
accordance with the principles established in prior decisions. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 283 (1964) (dissenting opinion). It refers to the
product, service or industry market in which the effect of the acquisition influences
competition. See also United States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F. Supp.
1003, 1016-17 (D. Colo. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 902 (1973); United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 649 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
10. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 461 (1964); accord,
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967); United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 659 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962).
11. Actual competition refers to the existing competition between the companies,
whereby the anticompetitive effects of the merger are already in operation in the market; it is the competitive overlap between competitors in the market. Stanley Works
v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 511 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June
5, 1973) (dissenting opinion). Here it refers to the "horizontal aspects of the case,
i.e., the amount of actual competition" in the line of commerce eliminated by the
merger. Id. at 502 n.9.
12. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964).
This is
known as a lessening of potential competition. United States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (D. Colo. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 902 (1973);
accord, United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963); Ekco
Prods. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745, 752 (7th Cir. 1965).
13. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957).
14. Id. at 593. See also United States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 329
F. Supp. 1003, 1016 (D. Colo. 1971), afI'd, 407 U.S. 902 (1973).
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"in terms of the product or line of products with respect to which there is
competition."' 5 Its boundaries "are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it."' 16 In consideration of the relevant geographic
market, courts have rejected the location where the parties to the merger do
business, and the place of competition, as proper criteria for evaluating the
geographic area affected. 17 Instead, the relevant geographic market is defined in terms of the area of "competitive overlap," the place where the effect of the merger on competition will be direct and immediate.18
The next step pertains to whether the effect of the merger "may be substantially to lessen competition" in that market. 19 To determine the merits
of substantiality in a given case it is necessary to ascertain the probable effect of the merger on the relevant area of effective competition. This is
done in light of the strength of the parties, the proportion of commerce involved in relation to the total volume in a particular market, and the probable
immediate and future effects which preemption of that market share might
20
have on effective competition therein.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States21 was the first case before the Supreme
Court to require a detailed analysis of the scope and purposes of the CellerKefauver Act. 22 In that case the Court designated the market share which
the companies may control by merging as one of the most critical factors,
especially where there is a history of a tendency toward concentration in the
relevant market. 23 Brown Shoe also established that a merger resulting in a
foreclosure of a market share which is de minimis does not have the effect of
"substantially lessening competition," and therefore such a merger is acceptable under the Celler-Kefauver Act.2 4 A later case, United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,2 5 provided additional guidelines in holding that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, resulting in a significant increase in the concentration of firms
15. United States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1003,
(D. Colo. 1971), a/I'd, 407 U.S. 902 (1973).

1016

16. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); accord, United
States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1003, 1016 (D. Colo. 1971),
a/I'd, 407 U.S. 902 (1973).
17. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 362 (1970);
United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963).
18. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 362 (1970).

19. United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355 (1963); United
States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (D. Colo. 1971),
ai'd,407 U.S. 902 (1973).
20. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 329 (1961); accord,
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593, 595 (1957).
21. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
22. Id. at 311 n.18.
23. Id. at 343, 346.
24. Id. at 329.
25. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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in that market, is "so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially
that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that
the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects."' 26 The Supreme Court in this case set out the general rule that an acquisition resulting
in a combined market share of greater than 30 percent would clearly indicate
control of an undue percentage of that market. 27 The Court also noted guidelines set forth by legal scholars in this area, but declined from intimating
whether they are reliable as a valid criterion of unlawful concentration. 28
They did not intend their decision in Philadelphiato be interpreted as purporting to hold all mergers resulting in less than a 30 percent market share as
necessarily not violative of the Celler-Kefauver Act.29
Other than the guidelines promulgated by the Justice Department, 30 there
is no distinct yardstick available to establish what constitutes a substantial
or undue percentage of the market. Congress has neither adopted nor rejected a specific definition of the word "substantially" by which the effects
of a merger on competition can be measured. 31 The legislature's use of the
words "may be substantially to lessen competition" is also an indication of a
hesitancy to be definitive, and reveals its concern with probabilities rather
than certainties. 32 Consequently, prior decisions must be resorted to when
deciding whether the competition foreclosed in a market share is substantial. The resolution of this problem is embodied in three basic considera26. id. at 363.
27. Id. at 364.
28. Id. at 364 n.41.

29. Id. at 364 n.41.

30. The Department of Justice would ordinarily challenge the following acquisitions or mergers between competitors: Where the four largest firms occupy less than
approximately 75 percent of the market, any merger as to which:
the other firm has
one firm has
5 percent or more
5 percent
4 percent or more
10 percent
3 percent or more
15 percent
2 percent or more
20 percent
1 percent or more
25 percent or more
Percentages not shown should be interpolated proportionately with those that are.
4510, at 6884. AccordJustice Department Merger Guidelines, 1 TRADE REG. REP.
ing to these tables the Stanley-Amerock merger would not ordinarily be challenged
unless Stanley's market share was at least 1.5 percent or .5 percent larger than it was.
The Department notes that where two distinct products are grouped within the same
line of commerce, "some modification in the minimum market shares subject to challenge may be appropriate to reflect the imperfect substitutibility of the two products."
Id. at 6884. Hence a horizontal merger of distinct products probably would not be
challenged on the basis of market share unless the market shares of the companies
were somewhat greater than the percentages indicated in the tables.
This was precisely the case in Stanley, for the two distinct products of residential
and architectural cabinet hardware were grouped into the single cabinet hardware line
of commerce.
31. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321 (1962).
32. Id. at 323 (emphasis added), quoting S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6

(1950).
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tions: (1) whether the line of commerce has been determined on the basis
of the case's specific facts, (2) whether the area of effective competition
has been carefully charted in the seller's market, and (3) whether the competition foreclosed constitutes a substantial share of the relevant market. 33
Regarding concentration, the Court in Philadelphiawent a step beyond the
"tendency toward concentration" mentioned in Brown Shoe, and considered
the effects of a merger in an already concentrated market. 34 "[I]f concentration is already great, the importance of preventing even slight increases

in concentration . . .is correspondingly great."' 5

Philadelphia, then, has

initiated a simple test to evaluate decreases in competition, based upon
market share and concentration. 36 The noteworthy element of this case,
however, lies not in attributing any differences between a market which is
tending toward concentration and one which is already concentrated, but
rather in recognizing any lessening in competition which is likely to result
from a merger in such markets. Consequently, where the evidence clearly
shows that a merger is not likely to have anticompetitive effects, the exist87
ing amount of concentration or tendency toward it is not critical.
8s
Unlike the cases which are cited as authority by the majority in Stanley,
the matter of the relevant product and geographic markets is of little consequence in the instant case. Though the court readily admits that the determination of these markets would be of critical importance,89 they are rendered virtually insignificant because of a stipulation agreed upon by Stanley
and the FTC. 40 The court also declined to entertain the merits of the poten33. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1961).
34. United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365 n.42 (1963).
35. Id. at 365 n.42.
36. Id. at 363.
37. See Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied,
41 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973) (dissenting opinion).
38. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Continental Can Co.,
378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271
(1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
39. Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41
U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973).
40. Under the stipulation, the sales of cabinet hardware products in the nation

constituted the appropriate product and geographic markets. It was also agreed that
sub-markets were irrelevant for the purposes of this case. Stanley Works v. FTC,
469 F.2d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973).
No doubt, as the court points out, the parties have agreed upon a set of facts, and they
as well as the court must be bound by them. Id. at 506. However, the unfortunate

aspect of this arbitrary situation, lies in the court's own realization that it does not
portray the actual market structure which they deem to be of critical significance in

the resolution of antitrust disputes.
The court discusses the probability of the appellant's increasing activities in the

residential cabinet hardware market, as noted by the Commission. It then points to
the appellant's contention of possible expanded production in the architectural market.
The court concludes that the acceptance of either view is of no consequence in light
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tial competition issue, and chose instead to base its conclusions solely on the
elimination of actual competition. 4
In reaching its decision, the majority
relied most heavily upon the "expertise" of the Commission in interpreting
the relevant market as being already concentrated. 42 Several cases were
cited in an attempt to establish that actual concentration is far more insidious
than a mere trend toward concentration. 43 Likewise, the court in Stanley attempted to discredit the appellant's contention that the competitive overlap
resulting from the merger was de minimis, though it did recognize that the
Celler-Kefauver Act can tolerate an inconsequential foreclosure of the
44
market share.
In an effort to uphold its position that the competition eliminated was indeed substantial, the majority enlisted as its standard two Supreme Court decisions. 45 It specifically relied upon the percentages 4 6 contained in United
States v. Pabst Brewing Co. 47 and United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.4 8 The former consisted of a merger between two huge national brewers
which was found to violate the Celler-Kefauver Act on state, regional, and national levels. The industry in this case was marked by a steady trend toward concentration in that the number of competitors had drastically declined while the size of the industry leaders had correspondingly increased. 49
The Aluminum Co. case involved the merger of the first and ninth ranked
competitors in the aluminum conduction market. The relevant market was extremely concentrated with the two top competitors alone controlling 50
percent of the market, and the first nine firms retaining a 95.7 percent market
share among them. There had also been a rapid trend toward concentration
in that the merger involved was the fifth acquisition by the producers of
primary aluminum within the preceding 7 years. This resulted in the reduction
of non-integrated aluminum fabricators from nine to only four.50 The basis of
the court's decision in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America5' was the
of the stipulation. Id. at 508 n.22. In referring to the stipulation the majority points

out that a "strategic litigation tradeoff" may have been involved. It blankets the
market structure in a mystery of the unknown, the discovery of which "we may not
permit ourselves to engage." Id. at 506.

41. Id. at 501 n.8. In his dissent, Judge Mansfield claims this actual competiton

issue was adopted by the majority as a new ground because they had recognized the

weakness of the case based upon elimination of potential competition. Id. at 509-10.
He supports his contention with the decisions of the Hearing Examiner and the Com-

mission. Id. at 509-10 nn.1 & 2.
42. Id. at 505.
43. Id. at 503-04.
44. Id. at 506.
45. Id. at 506-07.
46. Id. at 506-07.
47. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
48. 377 U.S. 271 (1964).

49. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550-51 (1966).

50. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 278, 279 n.6
(1964).
51. 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
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"disciplining effect" which the acquired firm had upon the market in question.52 It pointed out that the lessening of competition might "well be
thwarted by the presence of small but significant competitors,"5 3 and therefore
chose to preserve Rome Cable Company (the acquired firm) as an important
competitive factor in the aluminum conduction market. Though Pabst and
Aluminum Co. share similarities with the instant case, there was an enormous
disparity of anticompetitive effect between those cases and that evidenced in
Stanley.

54

An examination of Stanley reveals the difficulties involved in locating
and applying suitable precedent in antitrust cases. Because there are no
prescribed standards for illegality upon which the courts can rely, 5 decisions
concerning violations of the Celler-Kefauver Act require the utmost understanding of the complexities of the given market. 6 The court, although
acknowledging5 7 this established requirement,5 8 seemed to ignore the market
52. Id. at 281.
53. Id. at 280.

54. See Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,

41 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973) (dissenting opinion).
55. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320-21 (1962). Regarding
the level of market concentration in the Stanley case, the majority relied upon the
parameters given in K. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS 133 (1959) and Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy,
104 U. PA. L. REV. 176, 182 (1955). Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 503 n.11,
504-05 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973). The
United States Supreme Court, however, declined to intimate any view on the validity
of these very parameters. United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
364 n.41 (1963).
56. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 (1962).
57. The court states that in resolving the legality of all questions of antitrust activity, they are required to describe the involved companies, analyze the appropriate
markets and explore the affected industry structure. Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d
498, 499 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973). The
most striking feature of the Stanley case is the very fact that these complexities of the
cabinet hardware market are never really brought to bear.
58. For cases where the courts were able to recognize the complexities of their
respective given markets, see United States v. Phillipsburg Nat. Bank & Trust Co.,
399 U.S. 350, 362 (1970); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458
(1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 283 (1964)
(dissenting opinion); United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355
(1963); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961); United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957); United States v.
First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1003, 1017 (D. Colo. 1971), a[f'd,
407 U.S. 902 (1973). It should be noted here that the majority criticize the appellant
for relying upon the Tampa case because it also involved a section 3 violation of the
Clayton Act. The court stated that the "parameters of analysis in § 7 cases are not
the same as in § 3 cases." Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 507 n.20 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973). But see Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962). There the Court stated that the tests of
illegality under section 7 were intended to be similar to those applied in interpreting
the same language in other sections of the Clayton Act. In citing the legislative history, H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949), the court related that
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complexities in their conclusion that the Stanley-Amerock merger violated the
Celler-Kefauver Act. Judge Mansfield, in a well-reasoned dissent, emphasized the importance of dealing with the economic realities of the market.
He reiterated that actual competition is determined by actual competitive
facts (competitive overlap). 59 Not straying from the evaluative criteria
established in the Brown Shoe case, 60 Judge Mansfield reasoned that
Product markets and market percentages, whether or not stipulated, are
of significance in determining the probable effect of a merger on competition where they reflect actual competition between the parties ...
This process does not, as the majority suggests, change the parties'
stipulation as to the overall market, or create distinct lines of commerce or sub-markets. It merely judges actual competitive effects according to economic realities within the stipulated market rather than
ignore undisputed competitive facts of record. 61
In looking to the Pabstcase, the majority in Stanley holds out the 1.47 percent
control of the national market by Blatz Brewery to indicate that such a market share is an "undue percentage" calling for the automatic application of
the Celler-Kefauver Act to the instant case because the market was already
concentrated. Yet, the court paid no attention to the anticompetitive effects evidenced by the Pabst case. 62 The majority also ignored the economic
realities referred to by Judge Mansfield and instead insisted there was no
decisive significance between the 1.47 percent market share in Pabst and the
1 percent in Stanley.6 3 Similarly, the court in Stanley refers to the 1.3 percent
market share held by the Rome Cable Company in the Aluminum Co. case,
emphasizing the existence of a small but significant competitor. 64 It draws an
analogy between these two cases, but in doing so fails to attribute any weight to
the differences between them.

In United States v. Aluminum Co. of

Congress intentionally chose language for section 7 that was virtually identical to that
of section 3 of the Clayton Act.
59. Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 511 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41
U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973) (dissenting opinion).
60. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962).
61. Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 511 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
41 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973) (dissenting opinion).
62. The Pabst case reveals a market characterized by a 30-year decline in the number of brewers and a sharp rise in the size of market controllers in recent years. On
the national level Pabst controlled 4.49 percent of the market before the merger and
5.83 percent afterwards. The number of brewers declined from 714 in 1934 to 229 in
1961. In the period from 1957 to 1961, Pabst's competitors dropped from 206 to 162.
In that same period the nation's 10 leading brewers increased their combined market
share from 45.06 percent to 52.60 percent. In the Wisconsin market the number of
competitors was reduced from 77 to 54 in the 5-year period ending in 1961. Furthermore, the market share of the four leading sellers increased from 47.74 percent to
58.62 percent. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550-51 (1966).
63. Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 507 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41
U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973).
64. Id. at 507.
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America,65 the three leading competitors controlled 76 percent of a market
marked by prior acquisitions and notably tending toward high concentration. 6
In relating the disciplining effect which Rome Cable Company had on the market in question, the court further characterized the acquired company as an
"aggressive competitor," a "pioneer" with special "aptitude and skill," and as
being "active and efficient" in research and sales organization. 6 7 The facts in
Stanley show that the four leading firms in its market controlled only 49-51
percent,68 there was no tendency toward concentration, no evidence of any
other acquisitions or mergers in the industry, prior, during, or since the merger
with Amerock, and that Amerock's share remained constant during the 3-year
existence of the merged corporation.6 9 Furthermore, the majority admits there
has been no evidence indicating a disciplining effect of Stanley upon the rele70
vant market.
The court in citing Pabst and Aluminum Co. neglects the market complexities presented in those cases as it does in deciding its own case. The
majority rests its decision on bare market share percentages without determining if anticompetitive effects exist, reaching out to quash any "slight
increase" because the market is supposedly already concentrated. Nonetheless, even the Philadelphia opinion, from which the court in Stanley
quotes, 7' concedes that an undue percentage share resulting in a significant

increase in concentration is inconsequential where the evidence clearly shows
that the merger is not likely to have anticompetitive effects. 72 The court in
Stanley failed to consider this factor, and seems to overlook the Commission's burden of proof in this respect. 7s Congress has not merely mandated
the Commission or the courts "to campaign against 'superconcentration' in the
absence of any evidence of harm to competition. '74 It has also been pointed
out that where a merger involves two lines of commerce (i.e. bottles versus
cans, or residential cabinet hardware versus architectural cabinet hardware), the shortcut "market share" approach developed in the Philadelphia case is without merit, for the legality of the merger can only depend
65. 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
66. Id. at 278 n.6.
67. Id. at 281.
68. Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41
U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973).
69. Id. at 514 (dissenting opinion).
70. Id. at 501 n.8.
71. Id. at 504.
72. United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
73. Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 521 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41
U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973) (dissenting opinion). See also United States v.
First Nat'l Bancorporation, 329 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (D. Colo. 1971), aff'd, 407
U.S. 902 (1973).
74. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 584 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), citing Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78
HARv. L. REv. 1313, 1395 (1965).
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upon an inquiry into the competitive effects involved. 75 In citing the admonition set forth in the Philadelphiacase, 76 Judge Mansfield concludes in his
dissent that in the present situation the undisputed evidence clearly shows the
merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects. 77 What the
court appears to be advocating then, is that on the basis of a concentrated
78
market, any similar merger warrants a per se holding of illegality.
The decision in Stanley Works v. FTC 79 displays a manifest intent by the
court to vigorously foreclose any rising tide of economic concentration.
Such an intent cannot be interpreted as anything less than noble where the
effects of a merger may substantially lessen competition. However, since all
mergers have not been outlawed by Congress, the courts must keep in mind
that each case requires individual analysis.8 0 The significance of the Stanley
decision lies not only in the court's designation of a 1 percent market share as
an undue percentage or a substantial market share, but also in the fact that it
did so without resorting to the anticompetitive effects of the merger on competition. The court's decision, therefore, amounts to a holding that any merger
of this type in a concentrated market must be considered per se illegal regardless of its effect on competition. In its eagerness to erect a barrier
against a "rising tide," the court has been swept away from applying the appropriate criteria. In its opening statement, the court in Stanley Works v.
FTC"' sets out the proper approach to litigations involving the Celler-Ke75. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 475 (1964) (dissenting
opinion).
76. The Court there called for an injunction as to any merger producing a firm
which controlled an undue share of the market resulting in a significant increase in
concentration "in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely
to have such anticompetitive effects." United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
77. Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 517 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41
U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5, 1973) (dissenting opinion). Judge Mansfield reveals
that the cabinet hardware market was devoid of any trend toward concentration, devoid of parallel action by leading producers, and that there is no "appreciable enhancement in the market power of the merged enterprise as compared with its two
components." Id. at 509 (dissenting opinion). He also relates that Amerock's share
of the market remained constant from 1965 to 1968, which is uncontested, plus there
is no evidence of other mergers in the industry at any time prior to or since the StanleyAmerock merger. Finally, Judge Mansfield points out that the number of firms in the
market has actually increased from 1963 to 1968 without evidence of price leadership
or uniformity. Id. at 514 (dissenting opinion).
78. The court adamantly denies this, stating that such a conclusion is regrettable as
"nothing we decide today remotely hints at such a conclusion." Id. at 508.
79. 469 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5,
1973).
80. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962). Also a
policy of a case-by-case examination must be enacted by the courts to distinguish between mergers which threaten anticompetitive consequences and those which do not.
Turner, ConglomerateMergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 H~av. L. REV. 1313
(1965).
81. 469 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. June 5,
1973).
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